Bye Bye? „The golden days of social media are over“

Source: https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000213211/die-goldenen-zeiten-von-social-media-sind-vorbei?ref=article

Facebook has just turned 20 years old, and observers say: Social media has moved from places of exchange to places of passive consumption. Is that correct?

“Sorry, but Instagram sucks now,” was the title of a journalist in her article in “Vice” magazine. The author criticizes that the app shows too much advertising and too much irrelevant stuff like healthy recipes. „If it continues like this, Instagram will soon end up with the other social media zombies.“ She means, for example, Facebook. Because this platform is no longer what it once was.

Once upon a time, you could watch your friends explore all of Europe via Interrail, fidget to your favorite song in the club, paint a picture with watercolors or adore your new partner. You always stayed in touch via direct message – whether with your school colleagues or your holiday love. Instead, short videos, pictures and memes from accounts that you don’t actually follow are now appearing in the timeline. At best, an older relative posts a photo of her garden or a tasteless calendar saying.

On both platforms, this is due to the changed algorithm that the Meta Group introduced around two years ago. It ensures that users are no longer shown primarily what they want to see themselves, but rather what Instagram and Facebook believe is relevant to them.

This upsets quite a few people. A journalist from the online magazine “Krautreporter” says he mainly sees advertising and contributions from influencers. “I often wonder whether real people still post on social networks,” he continues. In another article he states: „Social media is dying out.“
Is it really over?

A similar sentence could recently be read in the Economist. The newspaper published an article entitled „The end of the social network“ to mark Facebook’s 20th anniversary in February. The cover photo shows an emoji with an offended expression about to sink into the sea. People would post less, the text says. The proportion of Americans who like to document their lives online has fallen from 40 percent to 28 percent since 2020. Can it really be that the time of social networks is over?
Woman with smartphone
Apparently people have less desire to document their lives online than before.
Getty Images/iStockphoto

Anyone who reads the entire article in the „Economist“ will quickly realize that it’s not about declaring social media dead. Rather, there is talk of a transformation: the social aspect of social media is being lost. While they were originally intended to combine personal and mass media communication, that is now changing again. The two functions would gradually be separated again. Status updates from friends have given way to videos from strangers; Postings would no longer be posted on Facebook and Co, but rather on messenger services such as Whatsapp or Telegram.
The new logic

The “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” (“NZZ”) analyzes that all of this is just the logical consequence of a development that has been going on for some time. In the early days of Facebook, users would have seen all posts regardless of their quality. It didn’t matter whether they actually interested her – the photo of a lunch, the selfie in the park, the crude thoughts about world events, all of that just appeared, in chronological order. Whoever had the most followers had the largest audience.

In 2009, Facebook began sorting posts by popularity. Whatever was liked the most was displayed at the top. Since then, the “closest circle” of friends and family has become increasingly less important, according to the “NZZ” analysis.

Recently, the Meta Group has also become increasingly oriented towards Tiktok. The app from China is particularly popular among younger people. Users can upload short videos there that are accompanied by music. Anyone who is on Tiktok will always see content from other people’s accounts. Ingrid Brodnig, a digital expert, isn’t surprised: „Facebook and Instagram have probably noticed that this is helpful so that people stay tuned.“ From the mass of posts, an artificial intelligence automatically selects those that the person in front of the screen might like. At the same time, fewer contributions come from friends.
Let yourself be showered

Brodnig also noticed what other observers stated: „The social aspect of social media has become less.“

The trend is rather to let yourself be showered. „Tiktok, for example, works more like RTL 2 than like a classic social medium, which is about interpersonal exchange.“ On Tiktok, a minority publishes the majority of posts. Or to put it another way: A few show themselves, many others watch them – unlike what was previously used to on social networks, where everyone revealed something.

The fact that many people no longer have as much desire to expose themselves online does not only apply to the USA. In Austria it is also currently evident that young people are using social media less. The disillusionment began years ago when “people lost their jobs, for example, because they posted something on Facebook while drunk.” False reports, hate comments and ridicule would have done the rest. „If you get angry because you post your lunch, you might think: Then I won’t post or I’ll post less often.“

 "If you get angry because you post your lunch, you might think: Then I won't post or I'll post less often." (Ingrid Brodnig, digital expert)

So who provides all the content? Influencers, politicians and people “with a great need to communicate”, for example with a political issue, says Brodnig. But also media and companies that want to advertise their products. Most others, however, are tired to a certain extent and prefer to sit back and consume. „The funny thing about it is that it’s not that noticeable because the feeds are of course designed so that we see the active ones. We don’t see that our friend Anna hasn’t posted anything for seven weeks, Facebook wouldn’t have any of that.“
Shifting to private groups

So if social networks are primarily there for consumption and the exchange shifts to private chats and chat groups: What are the consequences?

It could become a problem that messenger apps such as Whatsapp or Telegram are not moderated. Of course, this poses risks. In India, politicians used WhatsApp to spread lies – which might soon have been deleted on a platform like Facebook, according to the Economist. “Especially during the pandemic, you could see that a lot of misinformation and conspiracy myths were being spread via messenger apps,” says expert Brodnig. Furthermore: One should not believe that things are always peaceful and mindful in chat groups; debates would escalate there too.

Another possible consequence is that “social media will become a main entertainment channel,” says Brodnig. This is difficult, for example, for protest movements for which social media is an important place for networking. The expert also fears that an already very emotional public debate will be further emotionalized: „Tiktok is a system in which upsetting videos may have a good chance because people will stick around for longer.“
Not all bad

But not everything about it is bad. Brodnig suspects that people today should think more consciously about what they want to reveal about their private life and what they don’t. “We learned not to have to post everything.” Enjoying the moment seems to be more in vogue again. The channels would now also be viewed more critically. „When social media was new and fresh, there was a lot of enthusiasm. People thought: Wow, I can connect with my high school friend who I haven’t seen in ten years, or message friends from Argentina.“ Now many have recognized the dark side. „I believe that the golden age of social media is over.“

By the way, some are of the opinion that the future of platforms lies in their past. Unless they return to what they once were, they would surely perish. But are they right? The number of users on Instagram has grown steadily and is expected to continue to grow. So even though people are tired of posting, even though they’re annoyed – they stick with it.

He Emptied an Entire Crypto Exchange Onto a Thumb Drive. Then He Disappeared

Source: https://www.wired.com/story/faruk-ozer-turkey-crypto-fraud/

Faruk Özer just started a 11,196-year prison sentence. Did he almost get away with the biggest heist in Turkey’s history, or was it all just a big misunderstanding?

Faruk Fatih Özer stood in front of a passport control officer at Istanbul Airport, a line of impatient travelers queuing behind him. He pulled his face mask below his chin for the security camera. Surely he was nervous. The 27-year-old had unruly black hair, a boy-band face, and a patchy beard. Normally he overcompensated for his callow features by dressing in a pressed three-piece suit. But this spring day he wore black trainers and a navy-blue sweater hastily pulled over a white polo shirt, as if he had dressed in a dash. A small backpack was slung over his right shoulder. He looked like someone who could have been going on a last-minute day trip—or someone planning to never come back. At 5:57 pm on April 20, 2021, the guard stamped his Turkish passport and Özer shuffled through the crowd to Gate C, a flash drive containing a rumored $2 billion in crypto stashed in his belongings.

After Özer’s plane reached Tirana, Albania, at 9:24 that night, he checked into the Mondial, a popular 4-star business hotel in the capital’s commercial district. A couple of days later, he looked at his social media accounts. A mob was very angry with him: Customers couldn’t access their money on the exchange Thodex, where he was founder and CEO, and people were accusing him of absconding with their funds.

Özer posted a public letter to his company’s website and his social accounts. “I feel compelled to make this statement in order to respond urgently to these allegations,” he wrote. The accusations weren’t true, he said. Thodex—which had nearly half a million investors and $500 million in daily trade volume—was investigating what Özer claimed was a suspected cyberattack that caused “an abnormal fluctuation in the company account.” Assets would be frozen for five days while Thodex resolved the issue. This was terribly bad timing for the big business deal he said he was en route to make: selling the company, or so he had told some employees and his brother and sister before he left. All would be made right. “There will be no victims,” he promised. “I personally declare that I will return to Turkey within a few days and ensure that the facts are revealed in cooperation with judicial authorities and that I will do my best to prevent users from suffering.” Of course, there was this possibility too: He was in the midst of pulling off the biggest heist in Turkey’s history.

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Before dawn the day after Özer posted the letter, police squads fanned out across Istanbul and public prosecutors opened an investigation. Law enforcement arrested 62 people, including Thodex employees at all levels of the company—and Özer’s older brother and sister, Güven and Serap. Interpol issued a red notice, a request for law enforcement worldwide to find and “provisionally arrest” Özer pending his extradition to Turkey. Search teams deployed across Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. There were reported sightings of the dark-haired young man across Tirana, rumors that he had gone to a poultry farm, that an executive from the Albanian football league was sheltering him. Soon, the Albanian police arrested people accused of aiding and abetting him. But no one seemed to know exactly where Özer was.

Özer had vanished at a particularly precarious time in crypto’s annals: In the weeks leading up to his disappearance, so-called rug pulls—when a cryptocurrency exchange or altcoin developer absconds with investors’ funds—had crypto investors around the globe flabbergasted. The CEO of Mirror Trading International, a crypto trading company based in South Africa, defrauded users of more than $1 billion, then skipped town; TurtleDex, an anonymous decentralized finance storage project on Binance, reportedly vanished with $2.4 million; another decentralized finance project, Meerkat, reportedly fleeced investors out of $31 million (of which they paid back 95 percent). Blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis ranked rug pulls as the primary scam of 2021, accounting for 37 percent of all cryptocurrency scam revenue that year, up from 1 percent the year before.

Thodex was at the top of that roster, and nearly every major outlet from Bloomberg to Newsweek published headlines like “Turkish Crypto Exchange Goes Bust as Founder Flees Country” and “Turkish Cryptocurrency Founder Faruk Fatih Özer Seen Fleeing Country With Suspected $2 Billion From Investors.” CoinGeek called it “the biggest scam in the digital asset industry in 2021.” The New York Times’ headline read, “Possible Cryptocurrency Fraud Is Another Blow to Turkey’s Financial Stability.” In Turkey, the country I now call home, people were reeling: For years, crypto had been built up—largely by Özer but by others too—as a way out of economic volatility. Now it seemed like just another way to lose your life savings. But something felt off to me, like the whole story wasn’t being told.

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ILLUSTRATION: PRINCESS HIDIR

Faruk was born in February 1994, the youngest of three. He was inseparable from his brother, Güven, and sister, Serap. They grew up camping, playing video games, and cooking together. Friends always pointed out their shared sense of humor. His parents ran a print and copy shop in the city of Kocaeli, down the street from their house. They were observant Muslims who gave their children meaningful names: “trust” (Güven), “mirage” (Serap), and “the one who distinguishes between right and wrong” (Faruk).

Kocaeli is an industrial port town about 100 kilometers east of Istanbul surrounded by a checkerboard of tobacco and sugar beet fields, petrochemical plants, and paper mills. Roman emperors once lived there, and their crumbling fortress walls still wind through the landscape. After the Ottoman Empire collapsed, Kocaeli became a manufacturing boomtown, and its residents muscled the newly minted Republic of Turkey into the Industrial Revolution.

When Özer was born, Turkey’s economy was in a tailspin. A fragile financial system, irresponsible borrowing, and political corruption had triggered a brief period of triple-digit inflation. The lira’s volatility threatened the savings of its entire population. So many people moved their domestic assets to foreign-currency deposits that, by the end of the year, an astonishing 50 percent of bank deposits in Turkey were in a foreign currency. The year before, that figure was just 1 percent.

That same month Özer was born, a charismatic orator with a sympathetic gaze and push-broom mustache began campaigning through Istanbul’s streets in a paisley kipper tie. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan railed against the secular elite who had led the country to near economic collapse. A devout Muslim, he walked the streets of his home neighborhood, Kasımpaşa, a hardscrabble district where he grew up selling simit, or sesame bread, promising reform. In an upset election, he coasted into the role of mayor of Istanbul.

Around the same time, two Turkish business moguls launched Turkcell, the nation’s first mobile communication system. (This was a year and a half before the same technology was released in the US.) By 2003, Erdoğan was elected prime minister, kicking off a decade of unprecedented growth that foreign observers called Turkey’s “Silent Revolution.” In a turn away from his predecessors, he governed through the lens of a businessman, inaugurating a massive building boom across the country and ultimately wrangling Turkey’s rampant inflation. His pro-business rhetoric boosted the middle class and set Turkey on a path to European Union membership.

Özer also caught the spirit of entrepreneurship at an early age. As a teenager in the mid-aughts, he worked after-school shifts at his parents’ print shop. “Ever since I was a child, I wanted to do my own business, no matter what sector it was,” he said. At the end of his second year in high school, he decided that further study would not lead him to that dream, so he dropped out.

By 2013, Turkey’s gross domestic product had nearly tripled, the lira hovered just above the dollar, and the country was negotiating entry into the EU. BtcTurk, Turkey’s first crypto exchange (and reportedly the world’s fourth), was preparing to launch. Then, in May of that year, a group of activists gathered at Gezi Park in Istanbul to protest plans to redevelop it into a shopping mall with Ottoman-era architecture. They bridled not only at the loss of green space but also at the glorification of Turkey’s Islamist past in a society that called itself secular. Police brutally cracked down on the protesters, sparking a nationwide movement. Within weeks, more than 3 million people had taken part in the demonstrations, their frustration now encompassing the growing authoritarianism of Erdoğan’s government. Thousands were injured, and at least five died. Özer had just turned 19. In the following years, Erdoğan tossed a record number of journalists in jail and censored the internet, and foreign investors recoiled.

Around that time, Ismail H. Polat, an expert in engineering, information tech, and new media, was the first person to cover crypto on his YouTube channel. Now a lecturer at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University, the way he tells it, crypto was about trying to be financially free. In those early days, he says, “it was not the coin, but the spirit.” (After all, bitcoin was worth only $77 at the time.) For young people who felt that Erdoğan had pulled the rug out from under them, whether they knew it explicitly or not, crypto was a new way to protest.

At the same time, Özer’s generation was watching as tech startups were taking off around the world. Facebook had bought Instagram for $1 billion, and that spurred entrepreneurs to begin churning out apps. A lot of them were gaming-focused; Candy Crush brought in $1.5 billion in revenue in 2013. The Özers took note.

By then, Turkcell had become one of the world’s largest companies. Turkey’s mobile infrastructure and smartphone adoption rate became one of the fastest growing in the world. Polat credits this as the foundation for what came next: The dream began to shift from mere employment to entrepreneurship. Güven cofounded a company called Inline Yazılım; Faruk started one called Inline Teknoloji a few years later and another called Game Bridge after that. The brothers figured out how to crank out chintzy apps—cut-and-paste washboard abs for Instagram photos (pre-vanity-filters era) and addictive gambling games. “I started to sell almost every product that I thought could make a profit on the internet,” he told me. “This is how I took my first step into business life.”

By 2017, 14 years into Erdoğan’s rule, Turkey’s economy had come full circle. Erdoğan’s unorthodox economic policies—repeatedly cutting interest rates—were supposed to raise investment and make Turkey less dependent on foreign powers. Instead they led the country into an economic crisis; the value of the lira hit the skids, and after a failed coup attempt in 2016 people figured it would only get worse. Just as they had 23 years earlier, citizens began searching for places to shelter their money. Voilà, 2017 was also the first year bitcoin’s value shot sky high, from $9,000 to $20,000. Global trade volume also skyrocketed from $99 million to $16 billion.

Being early investors in tech wasn’t something that had historically been available to the average person in Turkey. The instant millionaires and billionaires and unicorns pretty much lived elsewhere. Now, Faruk Özer saw a possibility. People in Turkey could shelter their money in what was clearly going to be the next big tech boom. But the biggest opportunity wasn’t in trading coins—it was in running a cryptocurrency exchange. Exchanges collect people’s money and, for a commission, invest it; that gives people who don’t have the time or skills to invest directly into the blockchain a pathway to crypto. Users who go through an exchange don’t even have their own digital wallets; their money is stored until they withdraw it. (Hence the industry warning: “Not your wallet, not your coins.”)

“During conversations with friends, we realized the deficiencies in the cryptocurrency exchange sector in Turkey and that the market was open to new players,” Özer said. There were no regulations on running a cryptocurrency exchange; Özer could open one easier than he could open a simit stand. He could become rich. Everybody might become rich. So at the age of 23, Özer founded Thodex with 40,000 lira—around $11,100 at the time—of his own money. Soon, Serap began working for Özer as a company accountant; Güven too seemed to be around a lot, but his ties were unofficial.

Using a playbook from Silicon Valley, Özer began spreading the gospel of crypto around Turkey. By this time, there were a few other notable exchanges, but Özer gave crypto a face and a ubiquitous presence. He put up ads on billboards and at bus stations; he installed Turkey’s first bitcoin ATM in a luxury mall in Istanbul’s posh Nişantaşı neighborhood, more as a stunt than anything. In a TV interview, he explained, “People realized that it is a technology that they can turn into cash at any time. One of the most important helping tools in the spread of this perception was undoubtedly bitcoin ATMs.” He aired television commercials pushing Thodex, featuring a dozen Turkish celebrities, including actress Pınar Deniz and pop star Simge. That caught the attention of Turkey’s middle and upper classes.

Soon, Özer was ingratiated into the upper echelons of Turkish society. He was invited to sit on the board of organizations such as Blockchain Turkey, a respected crypto nonprofit in Istanbul, alongside the country’s biggest bankers. He was attending private meetings with Turkey’s highest ministers. He appeared regularly on news channels and in tech blogs. At one point, Thodex was hacked for many millions of lira (supposedly $14 million US), allegedly from an IP address in China. Özer says he compensated the customers’ losses out of his own pocket and reported the theft to the Istanbul Public Prosecutor’s cybercrime unit. Experts from regulating agencies audited Thodex’s financial infrastructure—and Özer claimed they gave the company a clean bill of health. (Though that couldn’t be confirmed.)

Istanbul began to feel like Las Vegas. Dazzling billboards and banners hawking crypto coins were everywhere. Backgammon cafés, where old men have been drinking tea and talking politics for centuries, buzzed with crypto gossip. Signs appeared on barber shops and storefronts advising customers that they could pay with bitcoin. Bitcoin booths opened in the Grand Bazaar, next to the gold-trading stalls where people once sheltered their money when empires collapsed. By 2020, Turkey had more people using cryptocurrency than almost anywhere else in the world. Istanbul had concluded a sweeping economic metamorphosis, from a historic trading post to an information technology leader to one of the top mobile gaming centers on the planet. And finally to a cryptocurrency capital. Crypto “transformed into a national mindset” among young people, Polat says.

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ILLUSTRATION: PRINCESS HIDIR

He added, though: “Money is an agreement between a government and its society in terms of national unity. But on the other side of the medallion, if everyone leaves the fiat—if everyone leaves the social agreement of their nation—it could derail the world.”

In 2020, Thodex moved into a sprawling high-rise in Kadıköy, a chockablock district on the Asian side of Istanbul. It had a big open floor plan and views of the Marmara Sea. Thodex was now the fastest-growing and second-largest cryptocurrency exchange in Turkey. In the office, Özer had a reputation for keeping to himself. His 85 employees, most of whom applied for their jobs at Thodex through ads on platforms like LinkedIn, say they were paid on time, received bonuses, got their time-off requests approved quickly, and enjoyed the Thodex-branded coffee mugs and other swag. But the young man in charge clearly had some bluster. One former employee told me Özer’s avatar on the in-house messaging system was an image of Leonardo DiCaprio’s character from The Wolf of Wall Street.

Like any CEO, Özer wanted to make it as easy as possible for customers to spend money on his products. He started a customer service center called Thodex Academy that offered an introductory guide to cryptocurrencies for new investors. He offered scandalously cheap commission rates, so low that industry experts were stumped as to how Thodex could be making a profit. The company also allowed people to buy crypto via credit cards; at times that was money an investor didn’t really have, but the hope was that a coin’s value would go up faster than the interest accrued on the card. (The US Securities and Exchange Commission was alerting the public to avoid crypto exchanges promoting the practice.)

Özer was also intent on taking Thodex global. In 2020, the company secured a money services business license from the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Özer endlessly paraded it around like a trophy, touting it in news interviews, on Thodex’s website, and on social media. Like the audit a few years earlier, the license seemed to prove that Thodex was legit—that it had passed all the record-keeping and anti-money-laundering checks, that it was a company people could trust.

By March 2021, 16 percent of people in Turkey were using crypto, putting the nation in the top five for crypto use, along with Nigeria, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Peru—all countries with struggling economies.

The value of the lira, meanwhile, was at a historic low—as was Erdoğan’s approval rating. In April, Turkey’s Central Bank announced a ban on the use of crypto for purchases or services, set to go into effect later that month. This sent a shock wave across the global crypto market. (Bitcoin’s value dropped 4.6 percent.) The central bank issued a statement saying bitcoin could “cause non-recoverable losses.” It also said bitcoin’s use could undermine confidence in the lira. The bank and Erdoğan promised more regulations to follow. Özer’s entire empire was under threat.

Özer had, for a few months, been running a PR blitz for Thodex’s fourth birthday, giving away iPhones, PlayStations, a Porsche Panamera, and Dogecoins. It worked—sort of. Thodex’s trade volume reportedly climbed to $538 million. At the same time, the price of bitcoin soared again, reaching a high of $63,000. If there ever was a ripe moment to flee with Thodex’s cold wallet, this was it. Days later, Özer stood at the Istanbul Airport, a ticket to Tirana in his hands.

As “wanted” fliers with Özer’s picture went up on telephone poles across Albania, Erdoğan held a Q&A with college students from all over the country and talked about his “war” with crypto. The outlook for Thodex’s 400,000 customers was grim. So many Thodex investors had put all of their money into Özer’s company—and all of their spouses’, parents’, in-laws’, and kids’ money too. They had taken out loans and lines of credit to buy more crypto.

One investor named Mahmut—$100,000 lost—had been using Thodex for three years and was in the final stages of buying a house and car for his family. (Like so many victims, he didn’t want to use his full name, because of a heavy burden of shame.) Mahmut had tried to withdraw his money—a mixture of savings and loans—in the days before the collapse, but it never came through. He attempted suicide three times. When his 2-year-old was diagnosed with autism, Mahmut took a job as a security guard at a storage facility to help pay for services for his son. At least two other investors were reported to have died by suicide.

Then there were friends of the family; Güven and Serap had also recruited customers. One was a former colleague of Güven’s; they had worked together through an advertising agency. Güven personally made a Thodex account for this colleague. Over time the two became friends, calling each other on birthdays. About Güven, the friend told me, “He’s a nice person who likes to joke around.”

But when he saw the maintenance notice on Thodex’s website, he called Güven to ask about withdrawing his money. “His phone was off, and would never turn on again after that,” he said. “I believed in it. It had public credibility. It had a license. It had an office. Tax registration number. Employees. It checked out as a reputable company,” he said. He lost $7,900—but, worse than that, he said, “I trusted it so much that I recommended Thodex to many friends, and they all lost their money too.”

Victims formed support groups online. People were devastated about losing their life savings, but they were also plagued by the mystery of what happened to Özer; they talked about Özer haunting them in recurring dreams. People questioned how Özer—this self-made 27-year-old who didn’t quite fit the profile of a tech bro or a transnational cybercriminal—could engineer the biggest theft Turkey had ever seen all by himself.

Two months after the collapse, Sedat Peker, an infamous, self-exiled mafia boss turned YouTuber, inflamed the situation with a series of cryptic posts on his YouTube channel and Twitter, accusing Turkey’s interior minister of collusion and profiteering. (The minister denied it, but photos of Özer and him at a 2019 meeting fueled a heap of conspiracy theories.) At one point before he disappeared, Özer apparently stayed in pandemic lockdown with the son of a member of Turkey’s parliament as they prepared to launch a new digital wallet service called Hoppara. A lawyer representing some victims speculated on a phone call with me that Thodex was actually a money laundering scheme, that Özer was just a puppet, and some other power was pulling the strings. Others I spoke with echoed this theory, and more than a few people strongly cautioned me to stop my reporting. Soon I started receiving anonymous threats.

Some vigilante programmers tried to trace the blockchain to see if they could find out if this was the work of one individual, a criminal network, or a vulnerable system. (As the joke about people who steal money and blame it on hackers goes, “I lost my bitcoin in a boating accident.”) They came up short. While others looked for the money, I decided to search for Özer. He reminded me of the young founders I used to interview in San Francisco when I was covering tech in 2013—ambitious, naive, and at times loose with ethics. Also, what aspiring fugitive would say where they were absconding to and then post letters from the road? So I booked a ticket for Tirana, the last place Özer was seen.

Two days later my apartment in Istanbul was ransacked in a way that seemed like a stern message. The wood on my front door was split open by force, and the contents of every drawer and cabinet were tossed around. The lock to a safe was snipped open, its contents—expensive camera equipment and cash—remained untaken. Even a laptop on the entry table appeared untouched. I canceled the trip.

Nearly one year after he disappeared, there was no sign of Özer or the money. Rumors flew that he was no longer in Albania. He could be in a hotel in Montenegro, a yacht off Kosovo, or a tropical hideaway in Thailand, people said; or he could be locked in a Tirana basement. People told me they thought he was dead, resting in a shallow grave.

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ILLUSTRATION: PRINCESS HIDIR

Güven and Serap idled in prison, awaiting their brother’s capture so that their trial could begin. In March 2022, Istanbul’s public prosecutor and Turkey’s Financial Crimes Board released the findings of their investigation. They painted Özer as a rapacious mountebank who used star-powered pitchmen to dupe people into funneling their savings into his criminal organization. The report asserted that, in 2017, Özer founded Thodex with the intention of operating it as a crime ring for money laundering and that every employee was a willing part of it—from the top executives down to the call-center workers who were placating customers and the social media managers who lured victims with promotions and sweepstakes.

The report traced scads of transactions through a shadowy web of financial accounts all allegedly under Özer’s control. It said that about $8 million in Thodex-held assets had been cashed out in gold bricks in Malta a few weeks before Özer’s disappearance. Özer might have escaped, but his employees and family were facing the possibility of spending many lifetimes in prison.

Just as hope of Özer’s resurfacing dwindled, the drama took a new twist: Sevgi Erarslan, a lawyer whom Özer’s father had hired initially to pay the victims back, then to represent his son in absentia, introduced herself to Twitter via a shocking tweet: She said she would refund any victims of Thodex if they legally withdrew their complaint against her client.

A wave of questions followed—where was this money coming from, and was Özer not just alive but in contact with Erarslan while wanted by Interpol? I sent her an email asking if I could speak with Özer. To my surprise, she called me immediately, saying that Özer was willing to be in touch. We began an occasional correspondence, though I often wondered if he really was the person answering my questions, if he was even really alive.

The trial went forward under a swirl of confusion and skepticism—about Özer’s whereabouts, about the large payments now being sent to victims from undisclosed sources, and about Erarslan’s legitimacy as his official lawyer. Of the 62 people who had been initially arrested, 21 were charged. On an overcast July morning, officers escorted those defendants into Istanbul’s beige brutalist courthouse, just a short walk from the Thodex headquarters where all the people on trial had once worked.

Güven wore a dark olive blazer, and his mustache was trimmed into a neat chevron. Serap sat with her back turned to him, cloaked in a trench coat pulled over a midnight black abaya. Özer’s lawyer, Erarslan, wore Turkey’s satin lawyer cloak and carried a Louis Vuitton purse. The sound of dozens of handcuffs being unhitched echoed through the cavernous room.

When Güven’s name was called, he stood, flanked by two crew-cut court officers sporting the dark irony of his name emblazoned on their vests (“Güvenlik” means “security”). He told the court that he had no official ties to Thodex. “I only come to the office for tea with my siblings,” he said. He explained how Thodex subcontracted his company for advertising services, and added: “My brother asked me to give him my personal account that I wasn’t using, so I let him use it.” Saying that his brother told him he was going to Albania to try to sell the company, he corroborated Faruk’s claim.

Without looking at her brother, Serap rose and explained that she was only an accountant; her job was to forward documents to an accounting firm. Like Güven, she had given Faruk her personal crypto exchange and bank account information at his request. “I didn’t think he was going to use it,” Serap said. “I can’t say that my brother opened those fake accounts in my name. Identity theft is common; it could have been anyone.” The head judge twirled her pen as Serap spoke, her voice sputtering and cracking. “I have been suffering from both physiological and psychological problems. I am so worn out physically.” When she began losing her breath and stumbling over her sentences, the judge excused her from the stand.

Özer’s siblings and former employees told the court about Özer’s request for access to scores of other accounts where he could personally initiate trades. To the prosecutors—and probably plenty of other people listening—this looked a lot like evidence of money laundering.

When the presiding judge called Özer’s name, Erarslan stood to testify on his behalf, waving a handwritten power of attorney, claiming to be able to represent the missing CEO. The judge shut her down, saying that the document was invalid.

One of the victims’ lawyers stood up and shouted that Erarslan should be kicked out of the courtroom. Erarslan shouted back. The room erupted into a circus. Judges and lawyers, victims and defendants—all volleyed slurs and accusations at one another. One of the defendants’ lawyers yelled at the judge: “You need to know how crypto works. To have a fair trial you have to understand how crypto works.”

Late one August night in 2022, a few days before the defendants back in Istanbul were to receive their verdicts, it became clear that Özer was very much alive. The Albanian police had been tailing a BMW X5 that they suspected was Özer’s and traced the car to an elegant two-story art-deco villa in the hills of Vlorë, a ritzy tourist town on what’s billed as the Albanian Riviera.

Just outside the driveway, they pulled over and waited. At 2:30 am, two people left the house and got into the BMW and started to pull out of the driveway. The cops stopped it, arrested two young men, and a police squad in bulletproof vests and balaclavas stormed the villa. In video footage taken of the raid, Özer, shirtless and wearing red shorts, looks shocked. He stumbles around the room. On a wall behind him, liquor bottles line the shelves. Three women were in the villa too. An officer grabbed Özer, and the young CEO, now wearing a white polo shirt, was handcuffed, escorted down a short flight of stairs, shuttled into an unmarked white van, and driven into the night.

At the police station in Tirana, Özer told the cops that he had been “hiding in the streets of poor neighborhoods.” He added that he got around by bus. “Since I grew up in a poor neighborhood in Turkey, I know how to deal with poor people. I looked for a house to rent by asking people on the streets.” He also said that he had been living off of $10,000 in cash he had brought into the country and money that was occasionally being wired to him—plus, some crypto trading. He confessed that he planned on eventually escaping to Greece.

For nearly a year, Özer sat in an Albanian prison, appealing his extradition back to Turkey. “We are trying to explain to the court that if I am extradited, I do not have a chance to get a fair trial,” he wrote to me. He called the trial “tragicomic.” His appeal was unsuccessful. In June 2023 he arrived at Istanbul Superior Court. His head was shaved; he still had the scruffy beard. The once buoyant tech founder was now staring down a prison sentence that could carry an astonishing 43,000 years.

When he finally stood before the court, judges allowed Özer to tell his story. Leaping at the chance, he powered up a presentation full of images and graphics, something not dissimilar to a pitch deck. Then he started to read from a 60-page soliloquy, his defense attorney clicking through slides at his instruction.

“I did not defraud anyone, I did not smuggle money abroad, I did not establish or manage a criminal organization,” he said with both frustration and sincerity in his voice. “I started a company.” He recognized people got hurt. Then he began trying to make a case that prosecutors (and the media) had simply, mistakenly, criminalized a business failure.

He mentioned a litany of those supposed problems: getting hacked, an “atomic bomb” of Dogecoin panic buying and selling that drained Thodex’s funds after the central bank announced its drastic curtailing of crypto. “The day I bought my ticket to go to Albania, most of the Dogecoin withdrawal requests could no longer be met,” he said. In his retelling, Özer arrived at the conclusion that the company itself was worth more than the funds in its wallet, so he saw only one way out: selling it. He started, he said, shopping it around in Istanbul, Italy, and the Balkans. He eventually set up meetings with several potential buyers in Albania. He didn’t give their names. Özer showed the courtroom a news clip with the widely circulated headline that he had fled with $2 billion and defrauded 400,000 people. “As soon as this news started to appear, both investors were off the table … I had no other chance to cover the losses of the stolen cryptocurrencies.” He pointed out that the indictment estimated the damages were closer to $43 million and the number of official claimants against him totaled 2,027 people.

Then his testimony took a Shakespearean turn. “This was also done with the aim of killing me or having me killed,” he said without flinching. “To announce to the world that a 27-year-old man with $2 billion in his pocket is alone in a country with high crime rates like Albania.” That, coupled with a red notice from Interpol on his back, and his face on wanted posters around Albania, made him fear for his life. So, he said, he bought a tent and took a taxi to the southern Albanian coastline. He had hoped to ride out the nightmare camping alone. “I needed time for the truth to emerge,” he told the room.

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ILLUSTRATION: PRINCESS HIDIR

He told the court that he grew his beard down to his clavicle, shaved his head. He said that when he learned about the prosecutor’s indictment—that his brother and sister were charged with fraud, that they would stand trial in a month, and that without Özer they would most likely take the blame for Thodex’s fall and spend the rest of their lives in prison—he had a wild idea: If every claimant were paid back, did a crime ever really happen? He did, in fact, have the Thodex cold wallet on him, he told the judges, though he claims to not remember how much was in it. He asked Erarslan to help him pay back the roughly 2,000 plaintiffs who had lost their money.

And they did, in part. In total, while on the run, he paid approximately 185 million lira ($10 million at the time) to more than 1,000 claimants. As Özer tells it, when the cold wallet was empty, he threw it into the Ionian Sea.

When he addressed his use of other people’s accounts to trade crypto—an action at the center of the case—he started to sound defiant and a little condescending: “Startup founders take all responsibilities, as the nature of startups requires,” he said. He underscored that they had no authority in the company and no access to these accounts. “There is no lawlessness or irregularity. Moreover, I am neither the first nor the last nor the only person to arbitrage the cryptocurrency market.”

Near the end of his address, Özer’s frustrations seemed to turn to bitterness and hubris. He faced the judges and said it was “absurd to think that the IQ level of the person who made such a stupid escape plan” was the same as that of a criminal mastermind allegedly capable of deceiving Turkish financial regulators for four years. “I am smart enough to lead any institution on earth,” Özer said. Then he had Erarslan pull up an image of a cartoon mocking the court. Visibly annoyed, the chief judge ordered him to remove it.

The verdict came quietly on a balmy Thursday in September 2023 to an almost empty courtroom. Özer stood and solemnly read the lyrics from a Turkish folk song, “The End of the Road Is Visible.”

The chief judge handed Güven, Serap, and Özer the same sentence: 11,196 years in prison—for establishing and managing a criminal organization and laundering assets. Most of the other defendants were released. It was the longest sentence in Turkey’s history, handed out the month before the Republic’s centennial.

Faruk Fatih Özer became a poster child of crypto crimes, but he also became an accidental representation of a particular economic era—and the lengths people will go through to flee it. To the Turkish regime, he was not so much an opponent as an unfortunate product of flawed economic policies. In that light, the draconian sentence is punishment not only for a crime but also for shining a spotlight on decades of embarrassing failures, ones that were made clear to the entire country the day that Özer disappeared.

So perhaps it’s no surprise that Turkey remains a haven for cryptocurrencies. In the year after Thodex went bust, inflation in the country hit a 24-year high of 85.5 percent. Prices for goods nearly doubled—and so did the percentage of Turks who owned bitcoin, ether, and other currencies. In terms of trade volume, the country ranks fourth globally, behind the US, the UK, and India. After decades of watching their currency devalue, their businesses and nest eggs get scrambled, the Turkish people aren’t going to pass up the dream so easily. Earlier this year, the country’s finance minister said the government was working to finalize new regulations on crypto, “to make this field safer and to eliminate possible risks.” So although Özer picked a fight with an authoritarian regime and lost—whether because he believed too fully in the gospel of decentralization, because he was a naive kid, because he was a cynical hustler, or some combination of all three—the flames of economic revolution that he helped fan aren’t going out anytime soon.

Source: https://www.wired.com/story/faruk-ozer-turkey-crypto-fraud/

WhatsApp Chats Will Soon Work With Other Encrypted Messaging Apps

Source: https://www.wired.com/story/whatsapp-interoperability-messaging/

New EU rules mean WhatsApp and Messenger must be interoperable with other chat apps. Here’s how that will work.

WhatsApp icon seen with many colorful icons

A frequent annoyance of contemporary life is having to shuffle through different messaging apps to reach the right person. Messenger, iMessage, WhatsApp, Signal—they all exist in their own silos of group chats and contacts. Soon, though, WhatsApp will do the previously unthinkable for its 2 billion users: allow people to message you from another app. At least, that’s the plan.

For about the past two years, WhatsApp has been building a way for other messaging apps to plug themselves into its service and let people chat across apps—all without breaking the end-to-end encryption it uses to protect the privacy and security of people’s messages. The move is the first time the chat app has opened itself up this way, and it potentially offers greater competition.

It isn’t a shift entirely of WhatsApp’s own making. In September, European, lawmakers designated WhatsApp parent Meta as one of six influential “gatekeeer” companies under its sweeping Digital Markets Act, giving it six months to open its walled garden to others. With just a few weeks to go before that time is up, WhatsApp is detailing how its interoperability with other apps may work.

“There’s real tension between offering an easy way to offer this interoperability to third parties whilst at the same time preserving the WhatsApp privacy, security, and integrity bar,” says Dick Brouwer, an engineering director at WhatsApp who has worked on Meta rolling out encryption to its Messenger app. “I think we’re pretty happy with where we’ve landed.”

Interoperability in both WhatsApp and Messenger—as dictated by Europe’s rules—will initially focus on text messaging, sending images, voice messages, videos, and files between two people. Calls and group chats will come years down the line. Europe’s rules apply only to messaging services, not traditional SMS messaging. “One of the core requirements here, and this is really important, is for users for this to be opt-in,” says Brouwer. “I can choose whether or not I want to participate in being open to exchanging messages with third parties. This is important, because it could be a big source of spam and scams.”

WhatsApp users who opt in will see messages from other apps in a separate section at the top of their inbox. This “third-party chats” inbox has previously been spotted in development versions of the app. “The early thinking here is to put a separate inbox, given that these networks are very different,” Brouwer says. “We cannot offer the same level of privacy and security,” he says. If WhatsApp were to add SMS, it would use a separate inbox as well, although there are no plans to add it, he says.

Overall, the idea behind interoperability is simple. You shouldn’t need to know what messaging app your friends or family use to get in touch with them, and you should be able to communicate from one app to another without having to download both. In an ideal interoperable world, you could, for example, use Apple’s iMessage to chat with someone on Telegram. However, for apps with millions or billions of users, making this a reality isn’t straightforward—encrypted messaging apps use their own configurations and different protocols and have different standards when it comes to privacy.

Despite WhatsApp working on its interoperability plan for more than a year, it will still take some time for third-party chats to hit people’s apps. Messaging companies that want to interoperate with WhatsApp or Messenger will need to sign an agreement with the company and follow its terms. The full details of the plan will be published in March, Brouwer says; under EU laws, the company will have several months to implement it.

Brouwer says Meta would prefer if other apps use the Signal encryption protocol, which its systems are based upon. Other than its namesake app and the Meta-owned messengers, the Signal Protocol is publicly disclosed as being used in Google Messages and Skype. To send messages, third-party apps will need to encrypt content using the Signal Protocol and then package it into message stanzas in the eXtensible Markup Language (XML). When receiving messages, apps will need to connect to WhatsApp’s servers.

“We think that the best way to deliver this approach is through a solution that is built on WhatsApp’s existing client-server architecture,” Brouwer says, adding it has been working with other companies on the plans. “This effectively means that the approach that we’re trying to take is for WhatsApp to document our client- server protocol and letting third-party clients connect directly to our infrastructure and exchange messages with WhatsApp clients.”

There is some flexibility to WhatsApp interoperability. Meta’s app will also allow other apps to use different encryption protocols if they can “demonstrate” they reach the security standards that WhatsApp outlines in its guidance. There will also be the option, Brouwer says, for third-party developers to add a proxy between their apps and WhatsApp’s server. This, he says, could give developers more “flexibility” and remove the need for them to use WhatsApp’s client-server protocols, but it also “increases the potential attack vectors.”

So far, it is unclear which companies, if any, are planning to connect their services to WhatsApp. WIRED asked 10 owners of messaging or chat services—including Google, Telegram, Viber, and Signal—whether they intend to look at interoperability or had worked with WhatsApp on its plans. The majority of companies didn’t respond to the request for comment. Those that did, Snap and Discord, said they had nothing to add. (The European Commission is investigating whether Apple’s iMessage meets the thresholds to offer interoperability with other apps itself. The company did not respond to a request for comment. It has also faced recent challenges in the US about the closed nature of iMessage.)

Matthew Hodgson, the cofounder of Matrix, which is building an open source standard for encryption and operates the messaging app Element, confirms that his company has worked with WhatsApp on interoperability in an “experimental” way but that he cannot say any more due to signing a nondisclosure agreement. In a talk last weekend, Hodgson demonstrated “hypothetical” architectures for ways that Matrix could connect to the systems of two gatekeepers that don’t use the same encryption protocols.

Meanwhile, Julia Weis, a spokesperson for the Swiss messaging app Threema, says that while WhatsApp did approach it to discuss its interoperability plans, the proposed system didn’t meet Threema’s security and privacy standards. “WhatsApp specifies all the protocols, and we’d have no way of knowing what actually happens with the user data that gets transferred to WhatsApp—after all, WhatsApp is closed source,” Weis says. (WhatsApp’s privacy policy states how it uses people’s data.)

When the EU first announced that messaging apps may have to work together in early 2022, many leading cryptographers opposed the idea, saying it adds complexity and potentially introduces more security and privacy risks. Carmela Troncoso, an associate professor at the Swiss university École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, who focuses on security and privacy engineering, says interoperability moves could potentially lead to different power relationships between companies, depending on how they are implemented.

“This move for interoperability will, on the one hand, open the market, but also maybe close the market in the sense that now the bigger players are going to have more decisional power,” Troncoso says. “Now, if the big player makes a move and you want to continue being interoperable with this big player, because your users are hooked up to this, you’re going to have to follow.”

While the interoperability of encrypted messaging apps may be possible, there are some fundamental challenges about how the systems will work in the real world. How much of a problem spam and scamming will be across apps is largely unknown until people start using interoperable setups. There are also questions about how people will find each other across different apps. For instance, WhatsApp uses your phone number to interact and message other people, while Threema randomly generates eight-digit IDs for people’s accounts. Linking up with WhatsApp “could de-anonymize Threema users,” Weis, the Threema spokesperson says.

Meta’s Brouwer says the company is still working on the interoperability features and the level of support it will make available for companies wanting to integrate with it. “Nobody quite knows how this works,” Brouwer says. “We have no idea what the demand is.” However, he says, the decision was made to use WhatsApp’s existing architecture to run interoperability, as it means that it can more easily scale up the system for group chats in the future. It also reduces the potential for people’s data to be exposed to multiple servers, Brouwer says.

Ultimately, interoperability will evolve over time, and from Meta’s perspective, Brouwer says, it will be more challenging to add new features to it quickly. “We don’t believe interop chats and WhatsApp chats can evolve at the same pace,” he says, claiming it is “harder to evolve an open network” compared to a closed one. “The second you do something different—than what we know works really well—you open up a wormhole of security, privacy issues, and complexity that is always going to be much bigger than you think it is.”

Critical Infrastructure Is Sinking Along the US East Coast

Source: https://www.wired.com/story/critical-infrastructure-is-sinking-along-the-us-east-coast/

Last year, scientists reported that the US Atlantic Coast is dropping by several millimeters annually, with some areas, like Delaware, notching figures several times that rate. So just as the seas are rising, the land along the eastern seaboard is sinking, greatly compounding the hazard for coastal communities.

In a follow-up study just published in the journal PNAS Nexus, the researchers tally up the mounting costs of subsidence—due to settling, groundwater extraction, and other factors—for those communities and their infrastructure. Using satellite measurements, they have found that up to 74,000 square kilometers (29,000 square miles) of the Atlantic Coast are exposed to subsidence of up to 2 millimeters (0.08 inches) a year, affecting up to 14 million people and 6 million properties. And over 3,700 square kilometers along the Atlantic Coast are sinking more than 5 millimeters annually. That’s an even faster change than sea level rise, currently at 4 millimeters a year. (In the map below, warmer colors represent more subsidence, up to 6 millimeters.)

Map of eastern coastal cities
Courtesy of Leonard O Ohenhen

With each millimeter of subsidence, it gets easier for storm surges—essentially a wall of seawater, which hurricanes are particularly good at pushing onshore—to creep farther inland, destroying more and more infrastructure. “And it’s not just about sea levels,” says the study’s lead author, Leonard Ohenhen, an environmental security expert at Virginia Tech. “You also have potential to disrupt the topography of the land, for example, so you have areas that can get full of flooding when it rains.”

A few millimeters of annual subsidence may not sound like much, but these forces are relentless: Unless coastal areas stop extracting groundwater, the land will keep sinking deeper and deeper. The social forces are relentless, too, as more people around the world move to coastal cities, creating even more demand for groundwater. “There are processes that are sometimes even cyclic. For example, in summers you pump a lot more water, so land subsides rapidly in a short period of time,” says Manoochehr Shirzaei, an environmental security expert at Virginia Tech and coauthor of the paper. “That causes large areas to subside below a threshold that leads the water to flood a large area.” When it comes to flooding, falling elevation of land is a tipping element that has been largely ignored by research so far, Shirzaei says.

In Jakarta, Indonesia, for example, the land is sinking nearly a foot a year because of collapsing aquifers. Accordingly, within the next three decades, 95 percent of North Jakarta could be underwater. The city is planning a giant seawall to hold back the ocean, but it’ll be useless unless subsidence is stopped.

This new study warns that levees and other critical infrastructure along the Atlantic Coast are in similar danger. If the land were to sink uniformly, you might just need to keep raising the elevation of a levee to compensate. But the bigger problem is “differential subsidence,” in which different areas of land sink at different rates. “If you have a building or a runway or something that’s settling uniformly, it’s probably not that big a deal,” says Tom Parsons, a geophysicist with the United States Geological Survey who studies subsidence but wasn’t involved in the new paper. “But if you have one end that’s sinking faster than the other, then you start to distort things.”

The researchers selected 10 levees on the Atlantic Coast and found that all were impacted by subsidence of at least 1 millimeter a year. That puts at risk something like 46,000 people, 27,000 buildings, and $12 billion worth of property. But they note that the actual population and property at risk of exposure behind the 116 East Coast levees vulnerable to subsidence could be two to three times greater. “Levees are heavy, and when they’re set on land that’s already subsiding, it can accelerate that subsidence,” says independent scientist Natalie Snider, who studies coastal resilience but wasn’t involved in the new research. “It definitely can impact the integrity of the protection system and lead to failures that can be catastrophic.”

map of Virgina's coastal areas
Courtesy of Leonard O Ohenhen

The same vulnerability affects other infrastructure that stretches across the landscape. The new analysis finds that along the Atlantic Coast, between 77 and 99 percent of interstate highways and between 76 and 99 percent of primary and secondary roads are exposed to subsidence. (In the map above, you can see roads sinking at different rates across Hampton and Norfolk, Virginia.) Between 81 and 99 percent of railway tracks and 42 percent of train stations are exposed on the East Coast.

Below is New York’s JFK Airport—notice the red hot spots of high subsidence against the teal of more mild elevation change. The airport’s average subsidence rate is 1.7 millimeters a year (similar to the LaGuardia and Newark airports), but across JFK that varies between 0.8 and 2.8 millimeters a year, depending on the exact spot.

map of JFK airport aerial
Courtesy of Leonard O Ohenhen

This sort of differential subsidence can also bork much smaller structures, like buildings, where one side might drop faster than another. “Even if that is just a few millimeters per year, you can potentially cause cracks along structures,” says Ohenhen.

The study finds that subsidence is highly variable along the Atlantic Coast, both regionally and locally, as different stretches have different geology and topography, and different rates of groundwater extraction. It’s looking particularly problematic for several communities, like Virginia Beach, where 451,000 people and 177,000 properties are at risk. In Baltimore, Maryland, it’s 826,000 people and 335,000 properties, while in NYC—in Queens, Bronx, and Nassau—that leaps to 5 million people and 1.8 million properties.

So there’s two components to addressing the problem of subsidence: Getting high-resolution data like in this study, and then pairing that with groundwater data. “Subsidence is so spatially variable,” says Snider. “Having the details of where groundwater extraction is really having an impact, and being able to then demonstrate that we need to change our management of that water, that reduces subsidence in the future.”

The time to act is now, Shirzaei emphasizes. Facing down subsidence is like treating a disease: You spend less money by diagnosing and treating the problem now, saving money later by avoiding disaster. “This kind of data and the study could be an essential component of the health care system for infrastructure management,” he says. “Like cancers—if you diagnose it early on, it can be curable. But if you are late, you invest a lot of money, and the outcome is uncertain.”

Source: https://www.wired.com/story/critical-infrastructure-is-sinking-along-the-us-east-coast/

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Inside Apple’s Big Plan to Bring Generative AI to All Its Devices

Apple was caught flat-footed when ChatGPT and other AI tools took the technology industry by storm. But the company is now preparing its response and plans to develop features for its full range of devices. Also: The future of the Mac comes into focus, a cheaper Apple Pencil debuts, and the Vision Pro gets closer.

One of the most intense and widespread endeavors at Apple Inc. right now is its effort to respond to the AI frenzy sweeping the technology industry.

The company has some catching up to do. Apple largely sat on the sidelines when OpenAI’s ChatGPT took off like a rocket last year. It watched as Google and Microsoft Corp. rolled out generative AI versions of their search engines, which spit out convincingly human-like responses to users’ queries. Microsoft also updated its Windows apps with smarter assistants, and Amazon.com Inc. unveiled an AI-enhanced overhaul of Alexa.

All the while, the only noteworthy AI release from Apple was an improved auto-correct system in iOS 17.

Now, Chief Executive Officer Tim Cook says that Apple has been working on generative AI technology for years. But I can tell you in no uncertain terms that Apple executives were caught off guard by the industry’s sudden AI fever and have been scrambling since late last year to make up for lost time.

“There’s a lot of anxiety about this and it’s considered a pretty big miss internally,” a person with knowledge of the matter told Power On.

 

As I first reported in July, the company built its own large language model called Ajax and rolled out an internal chatbot dubbed “Apple GPT” to test out the functionality. The critical next step is determining if the technology is up to snuff with the competition and how Apple will actually apply it to its products.

Apple’s senior vice presidents in charge of AI and software engineering, John Giannandrea and Craig Federighi, are spearheading the effort. On Cook’s team, they’re referred to as the “executive sponsors” of the generative AI push. Eddy Cue, the head of services, is also involved, I’m told. The trio are now on course to spend about $1 billion per year on the undertaking.

Giannandrea is overseeing development of the underlying technology for a new AI system, and his team is revamping Siri in a way that will deeply implement it. This smarter version of Siri could be ready as soon as next year, but there are still concerns about the technology and it may take longer for Apple’s AI features to spread across its product line.

Federighi’s software engineering group, meanwhile, is adding AI to the next version of iOS. There’s an edict to fill it with features running on the company’s large language model, or LLM, which uses a flood of data to hone AI capabilities. The new features should improve how both Siri and the Messages app can field questions and auto-complete sentences, mirroring recent changes to competing services.

 

Apple’s software engineering teams are also looking at integrating generative AI into development tools like Xcode, a move that could help app developers write new applications more quickly. That would bring it in line with services like Microsoft’s GitHub Copilot, which offers auto-complete suggestions to developers while they write code.

And Cue’s organization is pushing to add AI to as many apps as possible. The group is exploring new features for Apple Music, including auto-generated playlists (this is something Spotify rolled out earlier this year in partnership with OpenAI), as well as the company’s productivity apps.

Craig Federighi and Eddy Cue.Photographer: David Paul Morris/Bloomberg

Cue’s team is examining how generative AI can be used to help people write in apps like Pages or auto-create slide decks in Keynote. Again, this is similar to what Microsoft has already launched for its Word and PowerPoint apps. Apple is also testing generative AI for internal customer service apps within its AppleCare group, I’ve previously reported.

One debate going on internally is how to deploy generative AI: as a completely on-device experience, a cloud-based setup or something in between. An on-device approach would work faster and help safeguard privacy, but deploying Apple’s LLMs via the cloud would allow for more advanced operations.

 

The on-device strategy also makes it harder for Apple to update its technology and adapt to a fast-changing industry. With that in mind, I wouldn’t be surprised if the company adopts a combined approach: using on-device processing for some features and the cloud for more advanced tasks.

When it comes to getting this right, the stakes are high. Generative AI has quickly become much more than a buzzword and will be central to the next several decades of computing. Apple knows it can’t afford to take a back seat.

Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-10-22/what-is-apple-doing-in-ai-revamping-siri-search-apple-music-and-other-apps-lo1ffr7p?embedded-checkout=true

How Google Alters Search Queries to Get at Your Wallet

Testimony during Google’s antitrust case revealed that the company may be altering billions of queries a day to generate results that will get you to buy more stuff.

Recently, a startling piece of information came to light in the ongoing antitrust case against Google. During one employee’s testimony, a key exhibit momentarily flashed on a projector. In the mostly closed trial, spectators like myself have only a few seconds to scribble down the contents of exhibits shown during public questioning. Thus far, witnesses had dropped breadcrumbs hinting at the extent of Google’s drive to boost profits: a highly confidential effort called Project Mercury, urgent missives to “shake the sofa cushions” to generate more advertising revenue on the search engine results page (SERP), distressed emails about the sustained decline in the ad-triggering searches that generate most of Google’s money, recollections of how the executive team has long insisted that obscene corporate profit equals consumer good. Now, the projector screen showed an internal Google slide about changes to its search algorithm.

I was attending the trial out of long-standing professional interest. I had previously battled Google’s legal team while at the Federal Trade Commission, and I advocated around the world for search engine competition as an executive for DuckDuckGo. I’m all too familiar with Google’s secret games and word play. With the trial practically in my backyard, I couldn’t stay away from the drama.

This onscreen Google slide had to do with a “semantic matching” overhaul to its SERP algorithm. When you enter a query, you might expect a search engine to incorporate synonyms into the algorithm as well as text phrase pairings in natural language processing. But this overhaul went further, actually altering queries to generate more commercial results.

There have long been suspicions that the search giant manipulates ad prices, and now it’s clear that Google treats consumers with the same disdain. The “10 blue links,” or organic results, which Google has always claimed to be sacrosanct, are just another vector for Google greediness, camouflaged in the company’s kindergarten colors.

Google likely alters queries billions of times a day in trillions of different variations. Here’s how it works. Say you search for “children’s clothing.” Google converts it, without your knowledge, to a search for “NIKOLAI-brand kidswear,” making a behind-the-scenes substitution of your actual query with a different query that just happens to generate more money for the company, and will generate results you weren’t searching for at all. It’s not possible for you to opt out of the substitution. If you don’t get the results you want, and you try to refine your query, you are wasting your time. This is a twisted shopping mall you can’t escape.

Why would Google want to do this? First, the generated results to the latter query are more likely to be shopping-oriented, triggering your subsequent behavior much like the candy display at a grocery store’s checkout. Second, that latter query will automatically generate the keyword ads placed on the search engine results page by stores like TJ Maxx, which pay Google every time you click on them. In short, it’s a guaranteed way to line Google’s pockets.

It’s also a guaranteed way to harm everyone except Google. This system reduces search engine quality for users and drives up advertiser expenses. Google can get away with it because these manipulations are imperceptible to the user and advertiser, and the company has effectively captured more than 90 percent market share.

It’s unclear how often, or for how long, Google has been doing this, but the machination is clever and ambitious. I have spent decades looking for examples of Google putting its enormous thumb on the scale to censor or amplify certain results, and it hadn’t even occurred to me that Google just flat out deletes queries and replaces them with ones that monetize better. Most scams follow an elementary bait-and-switch technique, where the scoundrel lures you in with attractive bait and then, at the right time, switches to a different option. But Google “innovated” by reversing the scam, first switching your query, then letting you believe you were getting the best search engine results. This is a magic trick that Google could only pull off after monopolizing the search engine market, giving consumers the false impression that it is incomparably great, only because you’ve grown so accustomed to it.

Even if Google prevails in this antitrust trial, I predict its troubles will continue. A company executive at the trial spoke on the stand about Google’s “contract with the users” and its “honest results policy.” No matter what pretzel shape Google twists, no matter what loopholes and legalese it bandies about, defying reasonable user expectations is a loser’s game. Until then, Google’s massive market share and deep entrenchment in everyday life ensure that these warped results pollute our ability to discover and learn basic information about the world around us. The next time you Google, remember that you’re getting search results that have been skewed—not to help you find what you’re looking for, but to boost the company’s profits.

Source: https://www.wired.com/story/google-antitrust-lawsuit-search-results/#intcid=_wired-verso-hp-trending_4660c9be-a81f-4e77-ae09-3384b62740e8_popular4-1

‘Cancer-stopping’ drug ‘annihilates’ solid tumours

AOH1996 has been developed over two decades to target a protein found in all forms of the disease

A new “cancer-stopping” drug has been found to “annihilate” solid cancerous tumours in early stage studies.

The chemotherapy drug leaves healthy cells unaffected, scientists said.

The AOH1996 drug is named after a child – Anna Olivia Healy, born in 1996, who died when she was only nine after being diagnosed with a rare childhood cancer neuroblastoma.

Prof Linda Malkas and her team spent two decades developing the drug that targets a protein in all cancers, including the cancer that led to Anna’s death.

The protein, proliferating cell nuclear antigen (PCNA), was once thought too challenging to aim targeted therapies at.

PCNA in its mutated form encourages tumours to grow by aiding DNA replication and repair of cancerous cells.

Prof Malkas and her team at the City of Hope in California, one of the United States’ largest cancer research and treatment organisations, said the targeted chemotherapy appears to “annihilate” all solid tumours in preclinical research.

Selectively kills cancer cells

AOH1996 was tested in more than 70 cell lines and was found to selectively kill cancer cells by disrupting the normal cell reproductive cycle, but it did not interrupt the reproductive cycle of healthy stem cells.

Pre-clinical studies suggest the drug has been shown to be effective in treating cells derived from breast, prostate, brain, ovarian, cervical, skin and lung cancers.

The drug still needs to go through rigorous safety and efficacy testing and large-scale clinical trials before it can be used widely.

The first patient received the potentially cancer-stopping pill in October with the phase one clinical trial still ongoing and expected to last for at least two years.

Patients are still being recruited to the trial.

Researchers are also still examining mechanisms that make the drug work in animal studies.

‘Like snowstorm that closes airline hub’

Prof Malkas said: “PCNA is like a major airline terminal hub containing multiple plane gates.

“Data suggests PCNA is uniquely altered in cancer cells, and this fact allowed us to design a drug that targeted only the form of PCNA in cancer cells.

“Our cancer-killing pill is like a snowstorm that closes a key airline hub, shutting down all flights in and out only in planes carrying cancer cells.”

The professor called the results “promising” but made clear that research has only found AOH1996 can suppress tumour growth in cell and animal models.

Long Gu, the lead author of the study, said: “No one has ever targeted PCNA as a therapeutic because it was viewed as ‘undruggable’, but clearly City of Hope was able to develop an investigational medicine for a challenging protein target.”

The study, titled “Small Molecule Targeting of Transcription-Replication Conflict for Selective Chemotherapy”, was published in the Cell Chemical Biology journal.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/08/02/new-cancer-drug-aoh1996-may-annihilate-solid-tumours-study/

Open letter on the feasibility of “Chat Control”: Assessments from a scientific point of view

Source: https://www.ins.jku.at/chatcontrol/

Open letter on the feasibility of „Chat Control“:Assessments from a scientific point of view

Update: A parallel initiative is aimed at the EU institutions and is available in English at the CSA Academia Open Letter . Since the very similar arguments were formulated in parallel, they support each other.

The initiative of the EU Commission discussed under the name “ Chat Control ”, the unprovoked monitoring of various communication channels to detect child pornography, terrorist or other “undesirable” material – including attempts at early detection (e.g. “grooming” minors through text messages that build trust) – mandatory for mobile devices and communication services, has recently been expanded to include the monitoring of direct audio communications . Some states, including Austria and Germany , have already publicly declared that they will not support this initiative for monitoring without cause. AlsoCivil protection and children’s rights organizations have rejected this approach as excessive and at the same time ineffective . Recently, even the legal service of the EU Council of Ministers diagnosed an incompatibility with European fundamental rights. Irrespective of this, the draft will be tightened up even more and extended to other channels: in the last version even to audio messages and conversations. The approach appears to be coordinated with corresponding attempts in the US ( “EARN IT” and “STOP CSAM” Acts ) and the UK (“Online Safety Bill”).

As scientists who are actively researching in various areas of this topic, we therefore make the declaration in all clarity: This advance cannot be implemented safely and effectively. There is currently no foreseeable further development of the corresponding technologies that would technically make such an implementation possible. In addition, according to our assessment, the hoped-for effects of these monitoring measures are not to be expected. This legislative initiative therefore misses its target, is socio-politically dangerous and would permanently damage the security of our communication channels for the majority of the population.

The main reasons against the feasibility of „Chat Control“ have already been mentioned several times. In the following, we would like to discuss these specifically in the interdisciplinary connection between artificial intelligence (AI, artificial intelligence / AI), security (information security / technical data protection) and law .

Our concerns are:

  1. Security: a) Encryption is the best method for internet security. Successful attacks are almost always due to faulty software. b) A systematic and automated monitoring (ie „scanning“) of encrypted content is technically only possible if the security that can be achieved through encryption is massively violated, which is associated with considerable additional risks. c) A legal obligation to integrate such scanners will make secure digital communications in the EU unavailable to the majority of the population, but will have little impact on criminal communications.
  2. AI: a) Automated classification of content, including methods based on machine learning, is always subject to errors, which in this case will lead to high false positives. b) Special monitoring methods, which are carried out on the end devices, open up additional possibilities for attacks up to the extraction of possibly illegal training material.
  3. Law: a) A sensible demarcation from the explicitly permitted use of specific content, for example in the educational sector or for criticism and parody, does not appear to be automatically possible. b) The massive encroachment on fundamental rights through such an instrument of mass surveillance is not proportionate and would cause great collateral damage in society.

In detail, these concerns are based on the following scientifically recognized facts:

  1. Security
    1. Encryption using modern methods is an indispensable basis for practically all technical mechanisms for maintaining security and data protection on the Internet. In this way, communication on the Internet is currently protected as the cornerstone for current services, right through to critical infrastructure such as telephone, electricity, water networks, hospitals, etc. Trust in good encryption methods is significantly higher among experts than in other security mechanisms. Above all, the average poor quality of software in general is the reason for the many publicly known security incidents. Improving this situation in terms of better security therefore relies primarily on encryption.
    2. Automatic monitoring („scanning“) of correctly encrypted content is not effectively possible according to the current state of knowledge. Procedures such as „Fully Homomorphic Encryption“ (FHE) are currently not suitable for this application – neither is the procedure capable of this, nor is the necessary computing power realistically available. A rapid improvement is not foreseeable here either.
    3. For these reasons, earlier attempts to ban or restrict end-to-end encryption were mostly quickly abandoned internationally. The current chat control push aims to have monitoring functionality built into the end devices in the form of scanning modules (“Client-Side Scanning” / CSS) and therefore to scan the plain text content before secure encryption or after secure decryption . Providers of communication services would have to be legally obliged to implement this for all content. Since this is not in the core interest of such organizations and requires effort in implementation and operation as well as increased technical complexity, it cannot be assumed that the introduction of such scanners will be voluntary – in contrast to scanning on the server side.
    4. Secure messengers such as Signal or Threema and WhatsApp have already publicly announced that they will not implement such client scanners, but to withdraw from the corresponding regions. This has different implications for communication depending on the use case: (i) (adult) criminals will simply communicate with each other via “non-compliant” messenger services to further benefit from secure encryption. The increased effort, for example to install other apps on Android via sideloading that are not available in the usual app stores in the respective country, is not a significant hurdle for criminal elements. (ii) Criminals communicate with possible future victims via popular platforms, which would be the target of the mandatory surveillance measures discussed. In this case, it can be assumed that informed criminals will quickly lure their victims to alternative but still internationally recognized channels such as Signal, which are not covered by the monitoring. (iii) Participants exchange problematic material without being aware that they are committing a crime. This case would be reported automatically and possibly also lead to the criminalization of minors without intent. The restrictions would therefore primarily affect the broad – and irreproachable – mass of the population.It would be utterly delusional to think that without built-in monitoring, secure encryption could still be reversed. Tools like Signal, Tor, Cwtch, Briar and many others are widely available as open source and can easily be removed from central control. Knowledge of secure encryption is already common knowledge and can no longer be censored. There is no effective way to technically block the use of strong encryption without Client Side Scanning (CSS). If surveillance measures are prescribed in messengers, only criminals whose actual crimes outweigh the violation of the surveillance obligation will maintain their privacy.
    5. Furthermore, the complex implementation forced by proposed scanner modules creates additional security problems that do not currently exist. On the one hand, this represents new software components, which in turn will be vulnerable. On the other hand, the Chat Control proposals consistently assume that the scanner modules themselves will remain confidential, since they would be trained on content that is already punishable for mere possession (built into the Messenger app), on the one hand, and simply for testing evasion methods, on the other can be used. It is also an illusion that such machine learning models or other scanner modules, distributed to billions of devices under the control of end users, can ever be kept secret.NeuralHash “ module for CSAM detection, which was extracted almost immediately from corresponding iOS versions and is thus openly available . The assumption by Chat Control proposals that these scanner modules could be kept confidential is therefore completely unfounded and incorrect Corresponding data leaks are almost unavoidable here.
  2. artificial intelligence
    1. We have to assume that machine learning (ML) models on end devices cannot, in principle, be kept completely secret. This is in contrast to server-side scanning, which is currently legally possible and also actively practiced by various providers to scan content that has not been end-to-end encrypted. ML models on the server side can be reasonably protected from being read with the current state of the art and are less the focus of this consideration.
    2. A general problem with all ML-based filters are false classifications, i.e. that known “undesirable” material is not recognized as such with small changes (also referred to as “false negative” or “false non-match”). For parts of the push, it is currently unknown how ML models should be able to recognize complex, unfamiliar material with changing context (e.g. „grooming“ in text chats) with even approximate accuracy. The probability of high false negative rates is high.In terms of risk, however, it is significantly more serious if harmless material is classified as “undesirable” (also referred to as “false positive” or “false match” or also as “collision”). Such errors can be reduced, but in principle cannot be ruled out. In addition to the false accusation of uninvolved persons, false positives also lead to (possibly very) many false reports for the investigative authorities, which already have too few resources to investigate reports.
    3. The assumed open availability of ML models also creates various new attack possibilities. Using the example of Apple NeuralHash , random collisions were found very quickly and programs were freely released to generate any collisions between images . This method, also known as “malicious collisions”, uses so-called adversarial attacks against the neural network and thus enables attackers to deliberately classify harmless material as a “match” in the ML model and thus classify it as “undesirable”. In this way, innocent people can be harmed in a targeted manner by automatic false reports and brought under suspicion – without any illegal action on the part of the attacked or attacker.
    4. The open availability of the models can also be used for so-called „training input recovery“ in order to extract (at least partially) the content used for training from the ML model. In the case of prohibited content (e.g. child pornography), this poses another massive problem and can further increase the damage to those affected by the fact that their sensitive data (e.g. images of abuse used for training) can continue to be published. Because of these and other problems, Apple, for example, withdrew the proposal .We note that this latter danger does not occur with server-side scanning by ML models, but is newly added by the chat control proposal with client scanner.
  3. Legal Aspects
    1. The right to privacy is a fundamental right that may only be interfered with under very strict conditions. Whoever makes use of this basic right must not be suspected from the outset of wanting to hide something criminal. The often-used phrase: „If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear!“ denies people the exercise of their basic rights and promotes totalitarian surveillance tendencies. The use of chat control would fuel this.
    2. The area of ​​terrorism in particular overlaps with political activity and freedom of expression in its breadth. It is precisely against this background that the „preliminary criminalisation“, which has increasingly taken place in recent years under the guise of fighting terrorism, is viewed particularly critically. Chat control measures go in the same direction. They can severely curtail this basic right and make people who are politically critical the focus of criminal prosecution. The resulting severe curtailment of politically critical activity hinders the further development of democracy and harbors the danger of promoting radicalized underground movements.
    3. The field of law and social sciences includes researching criminal phenomena and questioning regulatory mechanisms. From this point of view, scientific discourse also runs the risk of being identified as “suspicious” by chat control and thus indirectly restricted. The possible stigmatization of critical legal and social sciences is in tension with the freedom of science, which also requires “research independent of the mainstream” for further development.
    4. In education, there is a need to educate young people to be critically conscious. This also includes passing on facts about terrorism. Through the use of chat control, the provision of teaching material by teachers could put them in a criminal focus. The same applies to addressing sexual abuse, so that control measures could make this sensitive subject more taboo, even if “self-empowerment mechanisms” are to be promoted.
    5. Interventions in fundamental rights must always be appropriate and proportionate, even if they are made in the context of criminal prosecution. The technical considerations presented show that these requirements are not met with Chat Control. Such measures thus lack any legal or ethical legitimacy.

In summary, the current proposal for chat control legislation is not technically sound from either a security or AI point of view and is highly problematic and excessive from a legal point of view. The chat control push brings significantly greater dangers for the general public than a possible improvement for those affected and should therefore be rejected.

Instead, existing options for human-driven reporting of potentially problematic material by recipients, as is already possible with various messenger services, should be strengthened and made even more easily accessible. It should be considered whether anonymous registration options for correspondingly illegal material could be created and made easily accessible from messengers. Existing criminal prosecution options, such as the monitoring of social media or open chat groups by police officers, as well as the legally required analysis of suspects‘ smartphones, can continue to be used accordingly.

For more detailed information and further details please contact:

Security issues:
Univ.-Prof. dr
Rene Mayrhofer

+43 732 2468-4121

rm@ins.jku.at

AI questions:
DI Dr.
Bernard Nessler

+43 732 2468-4489

nessler@ml.jku.at

Questions of law:
Univ.-Prof. dr
Alois Birklbauer

+43 732 2468-7447

alois.birklbauer@jku.at

Signatories: inside

  • AI Austria ,
    association for the promotion of artificial intelligence in Austria, Wollzeile 24/12, 1010 Vienna
  • Austrian Society for Artificial Intelligence (ASAI) ,
    association for the promotion of scientific research in the field of AI in Austria
  • Univ.-Prof. dr Alois Birklbauer, JKU Linz
    Head of the practice department for criminal law and medical criminal law )
  • Ass.-Prof. dr Maria Eichlseder, Graz University of Technology
  • Univ.-Prof. dr Sepp Hochreiter, JKU Linz
    Board of Directors of the Institute for Machine Learning, Head of the LIT AI Lab )
  • dr Tobias Höller, JKU Linz
    (post-doc at the Institute for Networks and Security)
  • FH Prof. TUE Peter Kieseberg, St. Pölten University of Applied Sciences
    Head of the Institute for IT Security Research )
  • dr Brigitte Krenn, Austrian Research Institute for Artificial Intelligence
    Board Member Austrian Society for Artificial Intelligence )
  • Univ.-Prof. dr Matteo Maffei, TU Vienna
    Head of the Security and Privacy Research Department, Co-Head of the TU Vienna Cyber ​​Security Center )
  • Univ.-Prof. dr Stefan Mangard, TU Graz
    Head of the Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communication Technology )
  • Univ.-Prof. dr René Mayrhofer, JKU Linz
    Board of Directors of the Institute for Networks and Security, Co-Head of the LIT Secure and Correct System Lab )
  • DI Dr. Bernhard Nessler, JKU Linz/SCCH
    Vice President of the Austrian Society for Artificial Intelligence )
  • Univ.-Prof. dr Christian Rechberger, Graz University of Technology
  • dr Michael Roland, JKU Linz
    (post-doc at the Institute for Networks and Security)
  • a.Univ.-Prof. dr Johannes Sametinger, JKU Linz
    Institute for Business Informatics – Software Engineering, LIT Secure and Correct System Labs )
  • Univ.-Prof. DI Georg Weissenbacher, DPhil (Oxon), TU Vienna
    (Prof. Rigorous Systems Engineering)

Published on 07/04/2023

AI drone kills it’s operator

„The system started realizing that while they did identify the threat,“ Hamilton said at the May 24 event, „at times the human operator would tell it not to kill that threat, but it got its points by killing that threat. So what did it do? It killed the operator. It killed the operator because that person was keeping it from accomplishing its objective.“

Killer AI is on the minds of US Air Force leaders.

An Air Force colonel who oversees AI testing used what he now says is a hypothetical to describe a military AI going rogue and killing its human operator in a simulation in a presentation at a professional conference.

But after reports of the talk emerged Thursday, the colonel said that he misspoke and that the „simulation“ he described was a „thought experiment“ that never happened.

Speaking at a conference last week in London, Col. Tucker „Cinco“ Hamilton, head of the US Air Force’s AI Test and Operations, warned that AI-enabled technology can behave in unpredictable and dangerous ways, according to a summary posted by the Royal Aeronautical Society, which hosted the summit.

As an example, he described a simulation where an AI-enabled drone would be programmed to identify an enemy’s surface-to-air missiles (SAM). A human was then supposed to sign off on any strikes.

The problem, according to Hamilton, is that the AI would do its own thing — blow up stuff — rather than listen to its operator.

„The system started realizing that while they did identify the threat,“ Hamilton said at the May 24 event, „at times the human operator would tell it not to kill that threat, but it got its points by killing that threat. So what did it do? It killed the operator. It killed the operator because that person was keeping it from accomplishing its objective.“

But in an update from the Royal Aeronautical Society on Friday, Hamilton admitted he „misspoke“ during his presentation. Hamilton said the story of a rogue AI was a „thought experiment“ that came from outside the military, and not based on any actual testing.

„We’ve never run that experiment, nor would we need to in order to realize that this is a plausible outcome,“ Hamilton told the Society. „Despite this being a hypothetical example, this illustrates the real-world challenges posed by AI-powered capability.“

In a statement to Insider, Air Force spokesperson Ann Stefanek also denied that any simulation took place.

„The Department of the Air Force has not conducted any such AI-drone simulations and remains committed to ethical and responsible use of AI technology,“ Stefanek said. „It appears the colonel’s comments were taken out of context and were meant to be anecdotal.“

The US military has been experimenting with AI in recent years.

In 2020, an AI-operated F-16 beat a human adversary in five simulated dogfights, part of a competition put together by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). And late last year, Wired reported, the Department of Defense conducted the first successful real-world test flight of an F-16 with an AI pilot, part of an effort to develop a new autonomous aircraft by the end of 2023.

Have a news tip? Email this reporter: cdavis@insider.com

Correction June 2, 2023: This article and its headline have been updated to reflect new comments from the Air Force clarifying that the „simulation“ was hypothetical and didn’t actually happen.

  • An Air Force official’s story about an AI going rogue during a simulation never actually happened.
  • „It killed the operator because that person was keeping it from accomplishing its objective,“ the official had said.
  • But the official later said he misspoke and the Air Force clarified that it was a hypothetical situation.

Source: https://www.businessinsider.com/ai-powered-drone-tried-killing-its-operator-in-military-simulation-2023-6

The First Crispr-Edited Salad Is Here

A startup used gene editing to make mustard greens more appetizing to consumers. Next up: fruits.

A gene-editing startup wants to help you eat healthier salads. This month, North Carolina–based Pairwise is rolling out a new type of mustard greens engineered to be less bitter than the original plant. The vegetable is the first Crispr-edited food to hit the US market.

Mustard greens are packed with vitamins and minerals but have a strong peppery flavor when eaten raw. To make them more palatable, they’re usually cooked. Pairwise wanted to retain the health benefits of mustard greens but make them tastier to the average shopper, so scientists at the company used the DNA-editing tool Crispr to remove a gene responsible for their pungency. The company hopes consumers will opt for its greens over less nutritious ones like iceberg and butter lettuce.

“We basically created a new category of salad,” says Tom Adams, cofounder and CEO of Pairwise. The greens will initially be available in select restaurants and other outlets in the Minneapolis–St. Paul region, St. Louis, and Springfield, Massachusetts. The company plans to start stocking the greens in grocery stores this summer, likely in the Pacific Northwest first.

 

A naturally occurring part of bacteria’s immune system, Crispr was first harnessed as a gene-editing tool in 2012. Ever since, scientists have envisioned lofty uses for the technique. If you could tweak the genetic code of plants, you could—at least in theory—install any number of favorable traits into them. For instance, you could make crops that produce larger yields, resist pests and disease, or require less water. Crispr has yet to end world hunger, but in the short term, it may give consumers more variety in what they eat.

Pairwise’s goal is to make already healthy foods more convenient and enjoyable. Beyond mustard greens, the company is also trying to improve fruits. It’s using Crispr to develop seedless blackberries and pitless cherries. “Our lifestyle and needs are evolving and we’re becoming more aware of our nutrition deficit,” says Haven Baker, cofounder and chief business officer at Pairwise. In 2019, only about one in 10 adults in the US met the daily recommended intake of 1.5 to 2 cups of fruit and 2 to 3 cups of vegetables, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Technically, the new mustard greens aren’t a genetically modified organism, or GMO. In agriculture, GMOs are those made by adding genetic material from a completely different species. These are crops that could not be produced through conventional selective breeding—that is, choosing parent plants with certain characteristics to produce offspring with more desirable traits.

Instead, Crispr involves tweaking an organism’s own genes; no foreign DNA is added. One benefit of Crispr is that it can achieve new plant varieties in a fraction of the time it takes to produce a new one through traditional breeding. It took Pairwise just four years to bring its mustard greens to the market; it can take a decade or longer to bring out desired characteristics through the centuries-old practice of crossbreeding.

 

In the US, gene-edited foods aren’t subject to the same regulations as GMOs, so long as their genetic changes could have otherwise occurred through traditional breeding—such as a simple gene deletion or swapping of some DNA letters. As a result, gene-edited foods don’t have to be labeled as such. By contrast, GMOs need to be labeled as “bioengineered” or “derived from bioengineering” under new federal requirements, which went into effect at the beginning of 2022.

 

The US Department of Agriculture reviews applications for gene-edited foods to determine whether these altered plants could become a pest, and the Food and Drug Administration recommends that producers consult with the agency before bringing these new foods to market. In 2020, the USDA determined Pairwise’s mustard greens were not plant pests. The company also met with the FDA prior to introducing its new greens.

The mustard greens aren’t the first Crispr food to be launched commercially. In 2021, a Tokyo firm introduced a Crispr-edited tomato in Japan that contains high amounts of y-aminobutyric acid, or GABA. A chemical messenger in the brain, GABA blocks impulses between nerve cells. The company behind the tomato, Sanatech Seeds, claims that eating GABA can help relieve stress and lower blood pressure.

Scientists are using Crispr in an attempt to improve other crops, such as boosting the number of kernels on ears of corn or breeding cacao trees with enhanced resistance to disease. And last year, the US approved Crispr-edited cattle for use in meat production. Minnesota company Acceligen used the gene-editing tool to give cows a short, slick-hair coat. Cattle with this trait may be able to better withstand hot temperatures. Beef from these cows hasn’t come onto the market yet.

Another Minnesota firm, Calyxt, came out with a gene-edited soybean oil in 2019 that’s free of trans fats, but the product uses an older form of gene editing known as TALENs.

Some question the value of using Crispr to make less bitter greens. People who don’t eat enough vegetables are unlikely to change their habits just because a new salad alternative is available, says Peter Lurie, president and executive director of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, a Washington, DC–based nonprofit that advocates for safer and healthier foods. “I don’t think this is likely to be the answer to any nutritional problems,” he says, adding that a staple crop like fortified rice would likely have a much bigger nutritional impact.

When genetic engineering was first introduced to agriculture in the 1990s, proponents touted the potential consumer benefits of GMOs, such as healthier or fortified foods. In reality, most of the GMOs on the market today were developed to help farmers prevent crop loss and increase yield. That may be starting to change. Last year, a GMO purple tomato was introduced in the US with consumers in mind. It’s engineered to contain more antioxidants than the regular red variety of tomato, and its shelf life is also twice as long.

Gene-edited foods like the new mustard greens may offer similar consumer benefits without the baggage of the GMO label. Despite decades of evidence showing that GMOs are safe, many Americans are still wary of these foods. In a 2019 poll by the Pew Research Center, about 51 percent of respondents thought GMOs were worse for people’s health than those with no genetically modified ingredients.

However, gene-edited foods could still face obstacles with public acceptance, says Christopher Cummings, a senior research fellow at North Carolina State University and Iowa State University. Most people have not made up their minds about whether they would actively avoid or eat them, according to a 2022 study that Cummings conducted. Respondents who indicated a willingness to eat them tended to be under 30 with higher levels of education and household income, and many expressed a preference for transparency around gene-edited foods. Almost 75 percent of those surveyed wanted gene-edited foods to be labeled as such.

 

“People want to know how their food is made. They don’t want to feel duped,” Cummings says. He thinks developers of these products should be transparent about the technology they use to avoid future backlash.

As for wider acceptance of gene-edited foods, developers need to learn lessons from GMOs. One reason consumers have a negative or ambivalent view of GMOs is because they don’t often benefit directly from these foods. “The direct-to-consumer benefit has not manifested in many technological food products in the past 30 years,” says Cummings. “If gene-edited foods are really going to take off, they need to provide a clear and direct benefit to people that helps them financially or nutritionally.”

Source: https://www.wired.com/story/wired30-crispr-edited-salad-greens/